Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?

Emmanuelle Auriol, Jean-Philippe Platteau and Giula Camilotti

No 12107, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to succeed than more indirect approaches when it comes to suppress gender-biased customs. This implies discussing the main possible interaction frameworks leading to anti-women equilibria, and deriving policy implications from the corresponding games. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples drawn from available empirical works, thus providing a reasoned survey of the literature.

Keywords: Social norms; Harmful customs; Gender; Coordination incentives; Expressive function of law; Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 K10 K36 O15 Z10 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Eradicating women-hurting customs: What role for social engineering? (2017)
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