Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 11867, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persua- sion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Keywords: Information design; Bayesian persuasion; Correlated equilibrium; Incomplete information; Robust predictions; Information structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2018)
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017)
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017)
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017)
Working Paper: Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017)
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