Volatility and Political Institutions: Theory and Application to Economic Growth

Timothy Besley and Hannes Mueller

No 10374, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper develops a model where an institutional constraint limits incumbent discretion to prevent adverse policy outcomes. We show that, in this framework, executive constraints have an impact on the mean and variance of policy. This allows us to interpret the empirical observation that growth volatility is lower in countries with strong executive constraints. We ?t the model to growth data and use our estimates to describe the heterogeneity in performance of weak and strong executive constraints across countries. This is used to illustrate the heterogeneous output response to the adoption of strong executive constraints. We then use the fitted values to consider the benefits of strong executive constraints in income terms.

Keywords: Executive constraints; Growth; Robust control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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