Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

Rabah Amir (), Igor Evstigneev and John Wooders

No 2001050, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; endogenous spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates (2003)
Working Paper: Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001050

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