Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk
Paolo Panteghini and
Carlo Scarpa
No 934, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
This paper addresses the issue of how regulatory constraints affect firm’s investment choices when the firm has an option to delay investment. The RPI-x rule is compared to a profit sharing rule, which increases the x factor in case profits go beyond a given level. It is shown that a pure price cap and profit sharing are identical in their impact on investment choices: the change in the option value that we have with a profit sharing regime exactly compensates the change in the “direct“ profitability of investment. Regulatory risk – breaching of the regulatory contract – may or may not affect negatively investment decisions. Even if a distortion exists, we show that this distortion is the same, even if a pure price cap could be considered riskier than a profit sharing rule.
Keywords: regulation; investment; RPI-x; profit sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_934
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