Weapons of Choice

Axel Dreher and Merle Kreibaum

No 5419, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This article investigates the effect of natural resources on whether ethno-political groups choose to pursue their goals with non-violent as compared to violent means, distinguishing terrorism from insurgencies. It is hypothesized that whether or not the extraction of fossil fuels sparks violence depends both on the group’s characteristics and the state’s reaction. Data are taken from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project, covering 118 organizations in 13 countries of the Middle East and North Africa over the 1980-2004 period. The multinomial logit models combine group- and country-specific information and show that ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using non-violent means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil. This effect is enhanced for groups already enjoying regional autonomy or being supported by a foreign state but can be mitigated by power sharing arrangements.

Keywords: terrorism; rebellion; resource curse; oil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Journal Article: Weapons of choice (2016)
Working Paper: Weapons of Choice (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5419

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