Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset

Van Ha Le, Jakob de Haan, Erik Dietzenbacher and Jakob de Haan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jakob de Haan

No 4254, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper employs a novel dataset on government wages to investigate the relationship between government remuneration policy and corruption. Our dataset, as derived from national household or labor surveys, is more reliable than the data on government wages as used in previous research. When the relationship between government wages and corruption is modeled to vary with the level of income, we find that the impact of government wages on corruption is strong at relatively low-income levels.

Keywords: corruption; government wages; government pay policy; efficiency wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J38 J41 J45 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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