The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy
Sascha Becker,
Katrin Boeckh,
Christa Hainz,
Ludger Woessmann and
Sascha O. Becker
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sascha O. Becker
No 3392, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
Do empires affect attitudes towards the state long after their demise? We hypothesize that the Habsburg Empire with its localized and well-respected administration increased citizens’ trust in local public services. In several Eastern European countries, communities on both sides of the long-gone Habsburg border have been sharing common formal institutions for a century now. Identifying from individuals living within a restricted band around the former border, we find that historical Habsburg affiliation increases current trust and reduces corruption in courts and police. Falsification tests of spuriously moved borders, geographic and pre-existing differences, and interpersonal trust corroborate a genuine Habsburg effect.
Keywords: Habsburg Empire; trust; corruption; institutions; borders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 N33 N34 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)
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https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3392.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long‐Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2016)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2016)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
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