Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles

Jorge Streb () and Daniel Lema ()

No 403, CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. from Universidad del CEMA

Abstract: While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are concentrated in a three-quarter window around elections. Cycles are statistically significant only in Latin America, but the pattern is similar to OECD countries: the budget surplus/GDP ratio falls in the election period and rises in the post-election period. In line with the logic of rational opportunistic manipulation, these effects cancel out.

Keywords: temporal aggregation; electoral window; pre- and post-electoral effects; political budget cycles; rational opportunistic cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-pol
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https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/403.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles (2012)
Working Paper: Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:doctra:403

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