Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conflict

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Empirical studies have found ethnic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict. Surprisingly, theoretical research on ethnic con.ict has been very scarce. In the present contribution a theoretical model of reputation and ethnic conflict is built. Depending on the information structure and the reputation cost of defecting, economic interaction can either result in (peaceful) trade or in appropriative conflict. Ethnic divisions affect the reputation cost of defection and therefore influence the conflict risk. It is shown what respective effects ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation have on the risk of conflict.

Keywords: Conflict; Ethnicity; Reputation; Information; Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 F10 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-soc
Note: Ec
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0658

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