Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

No 2102R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We provide an introduction to the recent developments in dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-G'rard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss revenue optimal mechanisms. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agents' types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents and limited liability, we conclude with a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.

Keywords: Dynamic Mechanism Design; Sequential Screening; Dynamic Pivot Mechanism; Bandit Auctions; Information Management; Dynamic Pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2017-08, Revised 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Literature (June 2019), 57(2): 235-274

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d21/d2102-r.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2019)
Working Paper: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2017)
Working Paper: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2102r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().