Inference on Optimal Treatment Assignments

Timothy Armstrong and Shu Shen
Additional contact information
Shu Shen: Dept. of Economics, UC Davis

No 1927R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider inference on optimal treatment assignments. Our methods allow for inference on the treatment assignment rule that would be optimal given knowledge of the population treatment effect in a general setting. The procedure uses multiple hypothesis testing methods to determine a subset of the population for which assignment to treatment can be determined to be optimal after conditioning on all available information, with a prespecified level of confidence. A monte carlo study confirms that the inference procedure has good small sample behavior. We apply the method to study the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa.

Keywords: Treatment assignment; Multiple testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 C18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2013-11, Revised 2014-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1927-r.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Inference on Optimal Treatment Assignments (2015)
Working Paper: Inference on Optimal Treatment Assignments (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1927r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().