Should Auctions be Transparent?

Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner ()
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Johannes Horner: Cowles Foundation, Yale University

No 1764R2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.

Keywords: First Price Auction; Persistent Values; Transparency; Disclosure; Repeated Auction; independent private value; information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D82 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2010-08, Revised 2017-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Should Auctions be Transparent? (2014)
Working Paper: Should Auctions Be Transparent? (2010)
Working Paper: Should Auctions Be Transparent? (2010)
Working Paper: Should Auctions be Transparent? (2010)
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