Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

Praveen Kumar and Nisan Langberg

RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 40, issue 1, 144-172

Abstract: Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder‐manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal renegotiation‐proof contract induces overstatements by managers, accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors. Our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00059.x

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