Vaccine and inclusionZéphirin Nganmeni, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho and Jean‐Baptiste Tondji Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 24, issue 5, 1101-1123 Abstract: In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a polarized economy facing a pandemic. In such an economy, individuals are organized around distinct networks and groups and have in‐group preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the set of inclusive and popular vaccine allocations. The findings imply that the number of vaccine doses necessary to generate an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation is greater than the one necessary to obtain an allocation that is only popular. The analysis further reveals that it is always possible to design the decision‐making rule of the economy to implement an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation. Under such a rule, the composition of any group endowed with the veto power should necessarily reflect the diversity of the society. Date: 2022 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:5:p:1101-1123 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC. |
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