Strategic Complementarity in the Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good

Sebastian Kessing

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 4, 699-710

Abstract: Individual voluntary contributions to a discrete public good are shown to be strategic complements in a dynamic private provision game. This is in contrast to a public good that can take on any value in a continuum where they are strategic substitutes.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:4:p:699-710

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