Sorting with Teams
Job Boerma,
Aleh Tsyvinski and
Alexander P. Zimin
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We fully solve a sorting problem with heterogeneous firms and multiple heterogeneous workers whose skills are imperfect substitutes. We show that optimal sorting, which we call mixed and countermonotonic, is comprised of two regions. In the first region, mediocre firms sort with mediocre workers and coworkers such that the output losses are equal across all these teams (mixing). In the second region, a high skill worker sorts with low skill coworkers and a high productivity firm (countermonotonicity). We characterize the equilibrium wages and firm values. Quantitatively, our model can generate the dispersion of earnings within and across US firms.
Date: 2021-09, Revised 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-isf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2109.02730
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