Shapley-like values without symmetry

Jacob North Clark and Stephen Montgomery-Smith

Abstract: Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for games." Specifically, we focus upon efficient but not symmetric allocations of value for cooperative games. We retain standard efficiency and linearity, and offer an alternative condition, "reasonableness," to replace the other usual axioms. In the pursuit of the result, we discover properties of the linear maps that describe the allocations. This culminates in a special class of games for which any other map that is "reasonable, efficient" can be written as a convex combination of members of this special class of allocations, via an application of the Krein-Milman theorem.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2018-09, Revised 2019-05
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