Revenue Insurance and Chemical Input Use Rates

R. Wesley Nimon and Ashok Mishra ()

No 20669, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Using farm level data and a simultaneous probit model we evaluate the input use and environmental effects of revenue insurance. A priori, the moral hazard effect on input use is indeterminate and this study empirically assesses the input use impact of the increasingly popular, and federally subsidized, risk management instrument of revenue insurance. We conclude that the moral hazard effect of federally subsidized revenue insurance products induces U.S. wheat farmers to increase expenditures on pesticides and reduce expenditures on fertilizers.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20669/files/sp01ni02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20669

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20669

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().