Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment

No 7476, Bulletins from University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center

Abstract: In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite large. Also, we show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations, while the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7476/files/bu960002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment (1997)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umedbu:7476

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7476

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bulletins from University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().