A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
Roberto Serrano and
Rajiv Vohra
No 28, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science
Abstract:
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).
Keywords: Virtual monotonicity; Bayesian monotonicity; Maskin monotonicity; virtual Bayesian implementation; incentive compatibility; type diversity; decentralization; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2002-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation (2005)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation (2002)
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