Alteration in Skills and Career-Enhancing in a Frictional Labor Market

Yosuke Oda ()
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Yosuke Oda: Graduate school of Economics, Osaka university

No 08-09, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This article constructs a job-search model in which worker fs ability varies over time; a highability unemployed might lose her skills due to prolonged unemployment whereas a low-ability employed might acquire her skills due to (an implicit) on-the-job training. We numerically show that both pecuniary reward for short-term unemployed and reduction in unemployment benefits leads to lower unemployment rate, however, the former policy does stimulate careerenhancing of long-term unemployed whereas the latter does not. In addition, numerical analysis suggests that mixture of the two policy can lead to higher aggregate welfare than under a sole policy.

Keywords: job-search model; cyclical change in skills; career-enhancing separation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0809

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