Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies

No 04-03-Rev, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism. Moreover, we prove that strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). This implies that, in classical pure exchange economies, dominant strategy implementability by a certain indirect mechanism is equivalent to truthful implementability in dominant strategy equilibria.

Keywords: Quasi-strong-non-bossiness; Strategy-proofness; Augmented Revelation Mechanism; The Revelation Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2004-03, Revised 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies (2004)
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