Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Klaus Abbink, Jordi Brandts, Benedikt Herrmann () and Henrik Orzen
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Benedikt Herrmann: EU Commission, Brussels

No 2009-03, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.

Keywords: Laboratory experiments; Rent-seeking; Conflict; Group competitiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D72 D74 F51 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game (2010)
Working Paper: Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game (2008)
Working Paper: Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game (2007)
Working Paper: Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2009-03

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