The Generalized War of Attrition

Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer

No 5872, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N + 1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K 1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player's value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill.

JEL-codes: D44 E43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as American Economic Review, Vol. 89, no. 1 (March 1999): 175-189.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Generalized War of Attrition (1999)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1999)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1997)
Working Paper: The Generalized War of Attrition (1996)
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