How Do Regulators Influence Mortgage Risk: Evidence from an Emerging Market
John Campbell,
Tarun Ramadorai and
Benjamin Ranish
No 18394, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
To understand the effects of regulation on mortgage risk, it is instructive to track the history of regulatory changes in a country rather than to rely entirely on cross- country evidence that can be contaminated by unobserved heterogeneity. However, in developed countries with fairly stable systems of financial regulation, it is difficult to track these effects. We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India over the 1995 to 2010 period to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and risk. We use cross-sectional differences in the time- series variation of delinquency rates, conditional on initial interest rates, to detect the effects of regulation on mortgage delinquencies.
JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-rmg and nep-ure
Note: AP CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18394.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: How Do Regulators Influence Mortgage Risk? Evidence from an Emerging Market (2012)
Working Paper: How Do Regulators Influence Mortgage Risk: Evidence from an Emerging Market (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18394
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18394
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().