Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight over the McFadden Act of 1927

Raghuram Rajan and Rodney Ramcharan

No 17266, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was felt over half a century later. This paper studies the Congressional voting behavior surrounding the Act’s passage. We find congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated, and credit costlier were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The evidence suggests that while the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financial system far into the future, they themselves are likely to be shaped by elites, even in countries with benign political institutions.

JEL-codes: G21 K2 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his and nep-pol
Note: CF DAE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2016. "Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 1843-1859, July.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927 (2016)
Working Paper: Constituencies and legislation: the fight over the McFadden Act of 1927 (2012)
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