Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools

No 16850, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher incentives increase student performance, attendance, or graduation, nor do I find any evidence that the incentives change student or teacher behavior. If anything, teacher incentives may decrease student achievement, especially in larger schools. The paper concludes with a speculative discussion of theories that may explain these stark results.

JEL-codes: I0 J0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
Note: ED LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (79)

Published as Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools Roland G. Fryer Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 373-407 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Society of Labor Economists and the NORC at the University of Chicago

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