Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina

No 15209, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It had already achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government towards a more open democracy. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point occurred in the 1930s when to stay in power, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked. The decade of unchecked electoral fraud led to the support for Juan Peron and subsequently to political and economic instability.

JEL-codes: E02 H11 K0 K11 N16 N26 N46 O11 O54 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
Note: DAE LE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Alston, Lee J. & Gallo, Andrés A., 2010. "Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 179-197, April.

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Journal Article: Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina (2010)
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