Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"

No 11235, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.

JEL-codes: O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-hpe and nep-pol
Note: EFG POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (120)

Published as Acemoglu, Daron. "Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay On Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects Of Constitutions," Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, v43(4,Dec), 1025-1048.

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