Market Power versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers and Research Joint Ventures: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

Ralph Siebert and Klaus Gugler ()

No 10323, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Merger control authorities may approve a merger based on a so-called 'efficiency defence'. An important aspect in clearing mergers is that the efficiencies need to be merger-specific. Joint ventures, and in particular research joint ventures (RJVs), may achieve comparable efficiencies possibly without the anti-competitive (market power) effects of mergers. We present evidence for the semiconductor industry that RJVs indeed represent viable alternatives to mergers. We empirically account for the endogenous formation of mergers and RJVs.

JEL-codes: L13 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
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Note: IO PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Klaus Gugler & Ralph Siebert, 2007. "Market Power versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers and Research Joint Ventures: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 645-659, 08.

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