Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Natacha Raffin

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We develop a political economy model that might explain the different environmental performance of countries, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. They also vote on a tax that will be exclusively used to finance environmental protection. We show that the model may generate multiple equilibria and agents' expectations may be self-fulfilling when the public policy is endogenous. Then, we analyse the long-term implications of a public policy that would favour education and make it possible to select the higher equilibrium

Keywords: Environmental quality; human capital; education; self-fulfilling prophecies; public policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 I28 O16 O40 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-edu, nep-env, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2014)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2014)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10042

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