Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and Positive Affect in Profit Maximization?

Markus Quirin (), Martin Beckenkamp and Julius Kuhl
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Markus Quirin: University of Osnabrueck
Martin Beckenkamp: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Julius Kuhl: University of Osnabrueck

No 2008_15, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost vs. benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not usually been considered. The present study aims at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After nine months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task (Social Values Questionnaire). We hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power should be associated with a tendency to maximize one’s profit but to care less about another party’s profit. Additionally, positive affect showed effects in the same direction. The results are discussed with respect to a motivational approach explaining socio-economic behaviour.

Keywords: economic decision-making; rational choice theory; personality; implicit power motive; positive affect; operant motive test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-dcm
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