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**The effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations
and quality of life in Cameroon**

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The effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon**Gislain S. GANDJON FANKEM, Dieudonné TAKA & Sévérin TAMWO****Abstract**

This article fills the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. For the first time, we assess the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon using original survey data from the Institute of Demographic Training and Research. The main results, based on a probit model, show that formal and informal competences acquired abroad reduce the likelihood that return migrants will improve social relations and increase the probability that they will increase quality of life in their home country. These results remain robust to the inclusion of return migrants from African and non-democratic countries. Correcting for the endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by two-stage probit model with instrumental variables does not alter these conclusions. Our results seem to corroborate the hypothesis that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination countries to countries of origin.

Keywords: Return migrants; skills; social relations; quality of life; Cameroon

JEL Classification: F22; O55; C3

1. Introduction

Does return migration increase or reduce social cohesion in the country of origin of migration? Given the importance of social cohesion and the myriad of policy efforts devoted to it, it is surprising that little is known about this issue. Indeed, most of the literature on return migration has focused on the occupational choice of migrants upon return and the determinants of their entrepreneurial activities (see for example, Wahba and Zenou (2012), Marchetta (2012), Hamdouch and Wahba (2015), Wassink (2020) and Croitoru (2020)). This is harmful, as social cohesion is both an end and a means to achieve other economic and development goals (Pervaiz and Chaudhary 2015; Majeed 2017).

As an end, more cohesive societies can be seen as harmonious and better places to live through reduced crime and conflict. As a means, social cohesion may have certain implications for different economic outcomes¹ (van Staveren and Knorringa 2008). First, more cohesive societies have better capacities to manage latent conflicts. They have fewer crimes and a better law and order situation. This creates an environment that is more conducive to investment and better economic growth. Second, in a society with strong social cohesion, fewer resources are needed to enforce law and order and property rights. Third, a potentially lower risk of political instability also allows a cohesive society to attract more investment by reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale.

There are at least two reasons for the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. The first reason is conceptual. Indeed, since Durkheim's seminal contribution (1893), the authors do not agree on a clear definition of social cohesion. Some see this concept as equivalent to solidarity and trust and others have defined it in the context of social inclusion, poverty and social capital. For example, Durkheim (1893) sees solidarity and shared loyalties as two types of social cohesion. Pervaiz and Chaudhary (2015) see social cohesion as a phenomenon of unity in a society. For Majeed (2017), social cohesion is the ability of a society to ensure the well-being

¹ The literature on the economic implications of social cohesion can be divided into two broad categories (Pervaiz and Chaudhary 2015). In the first part of the literature, the cohesiveness of society is generally referred to as social capital and measured by various indicators, such as engagement in civic activities, membership in social networks, the number of voluntary associations, trust in formal institutions and interpersonal trust (see, for example, Tabellini (2010) and Bjørnskov (2012)). This type of literature suggests that communities and societies where interpersonal trust is high and where civic and voluntary activities are more numerous can be more cohesive and have better economic outcomes. The second type of literature relies on some indirect measures, such as class division, ethno-linguistic division, elite dominance, material deprivation and social and income inequality as an indicator of social cohesion (see for example, Pervaiz and Chaudhary (2010) and Okediji (2011)). These studies suggest that social cohesion, measured in terms of diversity and different types of inequality, can affect economic growth through its effects on socio-political instability, inter-group conflict, the quality of institutions and the creation of human capital.

of all its individuals while reducing disparities and preventing marginalisation. Bernard (1999) criticised the fact that social cohesion is nothing more than a 'quasi concept' because it is vague and can change according to circumstances. This lack of consensus in defining social cohesion also reflects the multiplicity of dimensions and indicators associated with the concept².

The second reason for the lack of work is empirical. The issue of the effect of return migration on social cohesion in the country of origin of migration seems to be much more of a concern for developing countries. However, microeconomic data concerning these countries are scarce. Indeed, although embryonic, the few existing studies, which concern developed countries, rather explore the impact of emigration on the social cohesion of the host country based on a predominantly transnational approach (see for example Fanning (2013)).

The aim of this article is to fill the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. We advance the scientific discourse in several ways. Firstly, we provide, to our knowledge, the first microeconomic evidence of the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social cohesion in the country of origin. Secondly, we focus our study on Cameroon, a Central African country with a long and complex migration history and a poor understanding of its consequences. This country, which is also known to have some of the worst profiles of socio-economic inequality and ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity in Africa, lends itself well to our analysis of the link between return migration and social cohesion. Thirdly, since social cohesion is defined in different dimensions, we focus on two dimensions that are under-explored at the micro level, namely: social relations and quality of life. These dimensions are considered the broadest and most relevant (Jenson 1998; Bernard 1999; Schiefer and Der Noll 2017). Fourthly, as Bucheli et al. (2019) note, the effect of return migration is mainly associated with the attributes that migrants have acquired while abroad. Consequently, we use the skills acquired abroad by the returnee. However, the literature on the effects of return migration focuses on formal skills that incorporate: the level of education acquired and experience gained during formal employment abroad (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015; Wassink 2020; Croitoru 2020). It thus ignores informal skills such as the acquisition of external standards or experience gained during non-formal employment. However, there is some evidence that the capital accumulated abroad includes educational and vocational training, professional programmes, informal learning, acquisition

²By way of illustration, Jenson (1998) identifies five dimensions of social cohesion: belonging, participation, legitimacy, inclusion and recognition. Schiefer and Der Noll (2017) identify six dimensions: social relations, identification, orientation, shared values, equality and objective and subjective quality of life.

of a new language and acquisition of external standards (Grabowska and Jastrzebowska 2019). Our study is therefore based on three indicators that best bring together all this information: new competences in their generality, diplomas and qualifications and other qualifications. Fifthly, we use a rich and under-explored database from the survey conducted in 2012 by the Institute for Demographic Research and Training (IFORD) with the support of the United Nations Population Organization and the European Union. This database enables us to distinguish between the formal and informal skills of returnees acquired abroad in addition to certain fundamental traditional characteristics. Sixthly, empirically, one of the main challenges in determining is the potential endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by return migrants. This could be explained by reverse causality, as the lack of social cohesion may push people to move abroad. To deal with endogeneity, we use an instrumental variable probit and a recursive bivariate probit.

The main results show that formal and informal skills acquired abroad reduce the probability that return migrants improve social relations and increase the likelihood that they will improve quality of life in their home country.

The remainder of the article is organised in five sections. Section 2 sets out the analytical framework for the study. Section 3 presents the Cameroonian migration context. Section 4 describes the methodological framework. Section 5 carries out the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.

2. Theoretical considerations and related literature

Skills acquired abroad by return migrants can affect social cohesion in the country of origin through the institutional quality channel and the welfare channel.

2.1. Return migrants and the quality of institutions in the country of origin

The quality of institutions is a determinant of social cohesion (Schiefer and Der Noll 2017; Majeed 2017). Thus, by influencing the quality of institutions in the country of origin, the skills acquired abroad by return migrants affect social cohesion. This hypothesis derives from Levitt's (1998) theory of social transfers. According to Levitt (1998), the migratory experience allows migrants to absorb the external norms and practices that they implant in their communities of origin once they return. These foreign norms and practices influence the quality of institutions in the country of origin.

Among the few works devoted to the transfer of political norms, those of Spilimbergo (2009), Batista and Vicenté (2011), Chauvet and Mercier (2014) and Mercier (2016) are particularly noteworthy. Spilimbergo (2009) shows, based on a panel of developing countries, that external studies promote democracy in migrants' countries of origin. More precisely, he reveals that the level of democracy conveyed by the migrant in his country of origin is a function of his level in the host country. Batista and Vicenté (2011) will examine this relationship at the microeconomic level in the case of Cape Verde. Their results reveal that migration positively affects the demand for political accountability. This positive effect is attributed in particular to return migrants from countries with good institutional quality. In the case of Mali, Chauvet and Mercier (2014) examine the relationship between return migrants and political outcomes. They find that the return of migrants has a positive and significant effect on participation rates and electoral competitiveness. Finally, Mercier (2016) analyses the impact of the migratory experience of political leaders on their governance once they return. His results show that leaders who have studied abroad have a positive and significant effect on the level of democracy in their country during their mandates.

2.2. Return migrants and welfare in the country of origin

The skills acquired abroad by return migrants can also affect social cohesion positively or negatively by increasing or reducing the well-being of individuals in the country of origin. The positive effect comes from three non-exclusive mechanisms. First, returnees increase welfare by reducing unemployment and improving the quality of employment of non-migrants (Hausmann and Nedelkoska 2018). This reduces latent conflicts and strengthens social cohesion (Bjørnskov 2012). For example, Hausmann and Nedelkoska (2018) show in the case of Greece that, during the economic recession, the return of migrants was accompanied by more decent jobs and higher wages for non-migrants. Second, return migrants increase well-being by raising the educational performance of their children as well as their relatives through: income, reallocation of effort, changing perceptions about the value of education and remediation (Chen 2013; Liu et al. 2018). As an illustration, with earned income from migration, migrant parents can invest more in their children's education. Third, returnees reduce violence by contributing to social renewal and economic growth in their home communities (Bucheli et al. 2019). For example, Bucheli et al. (2019) find that higher rates of return migration lead to lower local homicide rates in Mexico.

The negative effect is associated with income and gender inequalities. These inequalities generate social conflict (Okediji 2011) and deteriorate social cohesion. With regard to income

inequality, return migrants are more likely to find work than people of the same socio-economic background who have not migrated. Compared to people who have never spent time abroad, return migrants generally possess higher formal human capital, including language, work experience, business skills and formal qualifications (Dustmann 1999). Returnees also bring back informal human capital in the form of social knowledge and technical skills acquired in foreign schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces (Grabowska and Jastrzebowska 2019). The result is a higher gain for return migrants than for those who did not emigrate. Thus, the return of migrants negatively affects the gain of non-migrants (De Coulon and Piracha 2005; Tuccio and Wahba 2018). For example, De Coulon and Piracha (2005), looking at returnees from Albania, find that regardless of gender, the experience of migration increases the hourly wage rate of returnees once they return. As for gender inequality, Tuccio and Wahba (2018) show that the return of migrants reinforces gender inequalities in the case of the Middle East. Using two indicators of gender inequality, namely women's freedom of mobility and decision-making power, the authors conclude that women residing in migrant families are more likely to bear the traditional gender equality norms than those with no migration experience.

3. The Cameroonian context

Cameroon lends itself well to our analysis of the link between skills acquired abroad by return migrants and social cohesion. This country, with a surface area of 475442 km² and an estimated population of 26545863 million inhabitants with Christian (56.5%), traditional (26%) and Muslim (21.8%) religions, has: 240 ethnic groups, 248 indigenous and regional languages, two official languages (French and English) and two languages (Camfranglais and Pidgin) resulting from contact with the French and English languages (Ndibnu Messina 2013). This religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, a source of social fragmentation, is a potential threat to social cohesion (Schiefer and Der Noll 2017). Economic and political conditions can also be associated with this diversity.

On the economic level, after the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s, followed the difficulties of the 1980s and 1990s orchestrated by a succession of crises that created a spiral of debt. As a solution, the Bretton Woods Institutions imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes on Cameroon. This led to the devaluation of its currency, the CFA Franc, in January 1994, the privatisation and closure of several public enterprises, the rise of mass unemployment and a steady deterioration of living conditions. In reaction, the Cameroonian

people adopted migration, mainly to Europe, the United States, the Near and Far East, as a solution to improving their living conditions.

On the political level, after the reunification of French and English speaking Cameroon on October 1, 1961 and the creation of a federal state, the first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo, installed a single party regime and unilaterally ended the federal state on May 20, 1972. This situation reinforced the secessionist movement in the English-speaking part of the country and condemned many Cameroonians to exile. Cameroon experienced a relatively stable period until the peaceful transition at the head of the supreme magistracy on November 6, 1982 between Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya. The latter, under international and national pressure, restored multiparty politics in 1991 and declared a general amnesty. This led to the return of migrants creating or strengthening opposition parties. But the first multiparty elections in 1992 saw his victory vigorously contested by the opposition. This creates a climate of social tension and repression fuelled by tribalist discourse and ethnic discrimination. Since then, this cycle has been repeated in every presidential election; exacerbated since 2008 by the suppression of the constitution of the limitation of presidential mandates. In addition, since 2016, there has been a radicalisation, through the creation of armed gangs, of the secessionist movement in the English-speaking part of the country. This movement as well as the radical political opposition to President Paul Biya seems to be encouraged by a large part of the Cameroonian diaspora in favour of political transition.

4. Data, variables and estimation strategy

4.1. Data

We rely on the unique data collected from August 4 to September 9, 2012 in Cameroon by the Institute of Demographic Training and Research (IFORD). These data were collected in the framework of the project entitled "Impact of South-South migration on the development of Cameroon" and financed by the United Nations Population Fund and the European Union.




Figure 1. Percentage distribution of migrants by region in Cameroon. Data derived from the survey conducted by IFORD.

This survey also provides information on the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants. More particularly, in the case of return migrants, the data collected provide information on age, marital status, gender, level of education, activity before leaving Cameroon, migratory experience, reasons for returning to Cameroon. The administered questionnaire allows data collection in 82 villages spread over the ten regions of Cameroon. Figure 1 gives the percentage distribution of returnees in the ten regions of Cameroon. From this data collection, 332 return migrants emerged. The favourite destination of return migrants is Central Africa, which accounts for a percentage of 46.68%, followed by West Africa

32.53%, Europe 9.93%, the Maghreb 5.41%, other continents 4.21% and other countries (Madagascar, Botswana, and Sudan)³ 1.204%.

4.2. Variables

4.2.1. Social relations and quality of life variables

Our understanding of the notion of social cohesion is not limited to interpersonal relationships and ties. Interpersonal relationships are only one dimension of social cohesion (van Staveren and Knorringa 2008). A society will only be cohesive if the bridging social capital (social relations and harmony between groups) is also strengthened (Schiefer and Der Noll 2017). Therefore, focusing exclusively on one dimension of social cohesion may not be an appropriate way to study this multidimensional phenomenon. Similarly, combining different indicators related to different dimensions of social cohesion in order to produce a unit index that can reflect social cohesion may also be problematic, as it does not show which dimension of social cohesion is important for determining economic outcomes (Pervaiz and Chaudhary 2015). In this study, we use two broad indicators of social cohesion considered most relevant by Schiefer and Der Noll (2017): social relations (captured by agreement between communities) and quality of life (captured by standard of living).

4.2.2. Skills acquired abroad by return migrants variables

Because the effect of return migration is mainly associated with the attributes that migrants acquire during their stay abroad (Bucheli et al. 2019), we use the formal and informal skills acquired abroad. Indeed, during their stay abroad, migrants acquire standards and skills that they transfer back to their home country upon return (Levitt 1998; Spilimbergo 2009; Batista and Vicenté 2011; Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Mercier 2016). We therefore select three indicators that best bring together all this information, namely: new skills as a whole (qualifications), degrees and qualifications and other qualifications (acquisition of social and environmental standards, improvement of life skills and other training taking place in an informal setting).

4.2.3. Socio-demographic characteristics and other control variables

³As far as migrants from Central Africa are concerned, 57 come from Gabon and 38 from Chad, i.e. a respective percentage of 36.77% and 24.51% of all migrants from Central Africa. In the case of West Africa, Nigeria alone received 74 migrants, i.e. 68.51%. In the case of Europe, France alone received 20 of these migrants, i.e. 60.60%. In the case of the Maghreb, the distribution seems more balanced.

We also retain two categories of additional explanatory variables. The first category consists of socio-demographic characteristics: age, age squared, duration after return, duration abroad and remittances. The age of migrants reflects their capacity to act as agents of development in their communities of origin (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015; Wassink 2020). Age squared captures the effect of the increasing age of migrants on their ability to drive change in their communities of origin (Wassink 2020). Length of time abroad is correlated with skill acquisition and therefore with the ability of migrants to be agents of development for their communities of origin (Cassarino 2004). Duration after migration provides information on the integration of the migrant into his or her community of origin (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015). Remittances influence social cohesion through the reduction of inequalities in countries of origin (Ratha 2013).

Table 1. Variables' présentation

| Variables | Description | Observations | Average | Standard errors |
|--|--|--------------|----------|-----------------|
| <i>Variable of interest</i> | | | | |
| Qualifications | =1 if the migrant has received any training or qualification of any kind and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.3012 | 0.4594 |
| Degrees and qualifications | =1 if the migrant has acquired new training and qualifications abroad during his stay. 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.256 | 0.4821 |
| Other qualifications | = 1 if the migrant has acquired other competences such as conduct, social and environmental norms or any other informally acquired competence. 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.364 | 0.481 |
| <i>Dependent variable</i> | | | | |
| Social relations | =1 if there is an agreement between the communities and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.704 | 0.456 |
| Quality of life | = 1 if the household containing the migrant is considered poor and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.3915 | 0.488 |
| <i>Instruments</i> | | | | |
| Languagemastery | =1 if the migrant masters the language of the host country and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.147 | 0.355 |
| <i>Other migration-related characteristics</i> | | | | |
| Duration abroad | Variable valued in months ranging from 3 to 390 months | 332 | 46.903 | 51.612 |
| Remittances | =1 if the migrant had transferred money to a person while abroad and 0 otherwise | 332 | 1.816265 | 0.565344 |
| Age | Variable that ranging from 12 to 77 years | 332 | 36.858 | 12.843 |
| Age squared | To account for the effect of increasing age on the dependent variable | 332 | 1523.003 | 1116.937 |
| Duration since return | Estimated duration in months ranging from 9 to 566 months | 332 | 88.487 | 91.864 |
| <i>Other determinants of social cohesion</i> | | | | |
| National language (English) | =1 if the migrant is fluent in Béti and 0 otherwise. | 332 | 0.093 | 0.2996 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|-----|--------|--------|
| National language (French) | =1 if the migrant is fluent in French and 0 otherwise. | 332 | 0.7108 | 0.4549 |
| Fluent in Ffuldéd | =1 if the migrant is fluent in Ffuldéd and 0 otherwise. | 332 | 0.253 | 0.435 |
| Fluent in Pidgin | =1 if the migrant is fluent in Pidgin and 0 otherwise. | 332 | 0.1385 | 0.346 |
| Fluent in Beti | =1 if the migrant is fluent in Beti and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.093 | 0.2996 |
| Immigrant investment | = 1 if immigrants have invested in Cameroon and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.213 | 0.3552 |
| Immigrant crime | = 1 if immigrants cause insecurity in Cameroon and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.1457 | 0.3552 |
| Refugee crime | =1 if refugees cause insecurity in Cameroon and 0 otherwise | 332 | 0.867 | 0.3902 |
| Refugeework | = 1 if refugees crowd out natives on the labor market and 0 otherwise. | 332 | 0.054 | 0.3075 |
| Place of residence | = 1 if the migrant lives in an urban area and 0 otherwise | 332 | 1.162 | 0.369 |

Source : Authors, based on the survey conducted by IFORD.

The second category includes control variables such as: language proficiency (fluency in official languages – French and English – and local languages – Beti, Pidgin and Ffuldéd –); immigrant and refugee background (immigrant crime, immigrant investment, refugee crime and refugee labour); and residence background. Language proficiency provides information on the level of fragmentation in society. The inclusion of immigrants and refugees results from the fact that migrants are not accepted by the natives because on the one hand, they crowd out the natives in the labour market and on the other hand, cause insecurity (Fanning 2013; Forrester et al. 2019). The place of residence determines the level of poverty (Sekkat 2017). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used.

4.3. Estimation strategy

As part of this study, we adapt the specification of Ivlevs and King (2017) to the context of our study. The choice of this specification is based on the fact that the author analyzes the effects of emigration on corruption. Corruption as an institutional indicator is considered to belong to the social relations dimension of social cohesion (Berger-Schmitt, 2002). We model the probability (Y_i^*) that a returnee i will influence social cohesion. Since the latent probability of influencing social cohesion depend on unobserved factors, we can not estimate directly Y_i^* . Thus the specified model captures the observed probability that returnee i will influence social cohesion Y_i . We do not observe Y_i^* unless the returnee i influenced the social cohesion of his home country. That is to say :

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } Y_i^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } Y_i^* \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

The unobservable latent variable Y_i^* is written :

$$Y_i^* = \alpha X + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

More specifically, equation 2 is written :

$$Y_i^* = \mu + \lambda Skills + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where, for individual i , the dependent variable is approximated by the agreement between communities and by the standard of living. The explanatory variable of interest *Skills* represents the attributes that the returnee acquires during his/her stay abroad and approximated alternately by the new competences as a whole (qualifications), degrees and qualifications and other qualifications. X represents the vector of socio-demographic characteristics and other control variables. ε_i denotes the error term, distributed according to a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance 1. Given the binary nature of social relations and quality of life, we estimate equation (2) using a probit. However, to guard against a potential problem of endogeneity, we also use an instrumental variable (IV) probit.

5. Results and discussion

5.1. Baseline results

For a better analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, we present and discuss the results of the estimation of the probit model in the case where the dependent variable is social relations. These results are recorded in the first half of Table 2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2 summarize the results when, respectively, the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants is degrees and qualifications, other qualifications and new competences as a whole (qualifications). For each of the variables of interest, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In other words, the new competences acquired abroad by the return migrant have a negative effect on the probability of social relations. This negative effect can mainly be explained by the transmission of norms received from outside. Indeed, during their stay abroad, migrants acquire political, social and institutional norms that are different from those of their country of origin, which they pass on to non-migrants upon their return (Spilimbergo 2009; Batista and Vicenté 2011; Mercier 2013; Tuccio and Wahba 2018). In the literature, migrants receive values that depend on the host country (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Spilimbergo, 2009). The negative effect can be explained by the fact that the database

focuses on South-South migration. Most African countries have experienced social fragmentation in the past. We have the case of the Biafran war (1967-1970) which was a conflict between ethnic groups, the main ones being the Haoussas, Yoruba and Igbo (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990). We also have the conflicts between muslims and christians in the Central African Republic (Arieff, 2014). Having lived in these countries, migrants transmit values that alter social cohesion in the country of origin.

Table 2 shows that the language inherited from colonization, namely: English has a negative and significant effect on social relations unlike the local language. The negative effect of the language can be explained by the fact that it was at the origin of identity-based withdrawal as has been the case in Cameroon for several years in the English-speaking part (Musah, 2022). The negative and significant effect of immigrant investment on social relations can be explained by the fact that instead of seeing migrant investment as an opportunity for job creation, non-migrants perceive immigrants as a rule as people who reduce employment opportunities in the labour market. For Altonji and Card (1991), an increased labour supply contributes to depressing the average wage of natives and immigrants as the labour demand curve falls. By lowering average wages, immigration shifts earnings from wage earners to capital owners.

Second, we present and discuss the results of the estimation of the probit model in the case where the dependent variable is quality of life. The results, when the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants is degrees and qualifications, other qualifications and new skills in their entirety (qualifications), are presented in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2 respectively. Regardless of the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants, the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This means that the new skills acquired abroad by the returnee positively affect the probability of quality of life in his or her home country. On the one hand, this result is consistent with Hausmann and Nedelkoska (2018), who show that return migrants increase welfare by reducing unemployment and improving the income and job quality of non-migrants. On the other hand, this result is also consistent with those of Chen (2013) and Liu et al. (2018), who find that return migrants increase welfare by raising the educational performance of their children and relatives. Moreover, the positive effect can be further explained by the work of Borjas (2014) which shows the effect of return migration on the wage structure of non-migrants. The impact of return migration on the wage structure depends entirely on the comparison and distribution of skills between migrants and non-migrants. If return migrants are relatively low-skilled, the

wages of unskilled natives decrease and the wages of the skilled increase. On the other hand, if return migrants are relatively skilled, the wage of the unskilled increases and the wage of the skilled decreases. In both cases, the effect of return migration is positive and its magnitude depends on the differences between the skill specialisations of migrants and natives and the share of migrants in the labour force.

Table 2 also shows that remittances, duration abroad and duration after migration improve the living standards of non-migrants. The positive effect of remittances is explained by the fact that they increase the income of recipient households, which can generate a multiplier effect for the whole community (Glytsos, 1993). This result is consistent with those of Adams and Page (2005) who show in a sample of 71 developing countries that remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world. The positive effect of duration abroad is explained by the fact that migrants choose an optimal duration abroad that allows them to build up sufficient resources in preparation for their return (Mesnard, 2004). The empirical literature shows that duration abroad is positively related to post-migration investment (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Therefore, the duration abroad is positively related to the improvement of the living standards of non-migrants. Finally, the positive effect of duration after migration reflects the idea of readjustment to one's community of origin (Cassarino, 2004). The faster it adapts, the faster migrants can use the resources they have to invest in an entrepreneurial activity to improve the living conditions of non-migrants (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015).

The probit specification represented by equation 3 does not solve the endogeneity problems (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015; Wassink, 2020) driven by the variables *new skills*. In case of endogeneity, the coefficients from the estimation of the probit model may be under- or overestimated (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Thus, to solve this endogeneity problem, we estimate a two-stage probit with instrumental variables.

5.2. Robustness checks

We carry out two robustness checks. Firstly, to assess the sensitivity of the results in terms of transmission of standards we distinguish two cases. In the first case, we make the estimates by separating our database into return migrants from African countries and return migrants from non-African countries (Table 3). In the second case, we make the estimates by dividing our database into return migrants from democratic countries and return migrants from non-democratic countries (Table 4). The results remain identical to those obtained in Table 2 for

the sample of return migrants from African countries and the sample of return migrants from non-democratic countries. In the cases of the sample of return migrants from non-African countries and the sample of return migrants from non-democratic countries, we do not observe statistically significant effects. This may be due to the size of the sample, which remains very small in these cases.

Secondly, a problem of endogeneity resulting from the existence of reverse causality may arise. The lack of social cohesion in the country of origin may push individuals to migrate. More specifically, the standard of living of the household or violence between communities can be considered as factors that explain migration. King (2012) argues that migration is driven by socio-economic factors in the migrants' home country. Thus, once abroad, migrants acquire skills that match the needs of the home country (Cassorino, 2004). At the same time, the new skills acquired abroad influence social cohesion in the home country. These new skills may enable migrants to invest and thus improve the living standards of non-migrants (Wassink, 2020; Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Second, Levitt's (1998) studies show that once abroad, migrants are exposed to practices and values that they pass on to their relatives either through telephone contacts or once they return. Thus, migrants who have lived in countries where different communities live peacefully, transfer these values to their home communities upon return. In order to control for this potential endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage probit model with instrumental variables (IV). According to Greene (2008), a good instrument should be highly correlated with the endogenous predictor but should not have an unobservable relationship with the dependent variable. Similarly to Hamdouch and Wahba, (2015) we instrument new competences acquired abroad by the mastery of the language of host country. The mastery of the language of the host country has a direct effect of new competences acquired abroad but this variable has no effect of social cohesion of the home country. The specification equation for the two-stage probit model with instrumental variables is :

$$Skills_i = a_0X + a_1Lang_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where $Lang_i$ refers to language mastery of the host country by the migrant i . Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the probit model with instrumental variable. In Table 5, columns (1), (2) and (3) confirm that our instrument is positive and statistically significant at the 1% threshold.

The p-values associated with the Wald exogeneity test are respectively: 0.704, 0.456, and 0.334 in the case of degrees and qualifications, other qualifications, and qualifications. Thus, the Wald test of exogeneity failed to reject the hypothesis that the error term in the first stage is not correlated with the error term in the second stage of the regression. The non-significant Wald test indicates that endogeneity is not a serious concern in the case of return migration and social cohesion in the case of Cameroon. This finding is consistent with studies on return migrants (Wassink, 2020). Overall, controlling for endogeneity with the two-stage probit model with exogenous regressors does not alter the conclusions in Table 2.

Table 2. Effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life (probit model)

| | Social relations | | | Quality of life | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Degrees and qualifications | -0.118* (0.0668) | | | 0.185*** (0.0684) | | |
| Other qualifications | | -0.160*** (0.0597) | | | 0.138** (0.0618) | |
| Qualifications | | | -0.176*** (0.0559) | | | 0.173*** (0.0586) |
| | 0.00113 (0.000688) | 0.00103 (0.000655) | 0.00118* (0.000676) | 0.000808 (0.000562) | 0.000945* (0.000566) | 0.000862** (0.000431) |
| Duration sinceabroad | 4.06e-05 (0.000401) | -2.80e-05 (0.000403) | 9.00e-06 (0.000397) | 0.000342 (0.000425) | 0.000442* (0.000264) | 0.000412** (0.000137) |
| Age | -0.00636 (0.00940) | -0.00684 (0.00961) | -0.00645 (0.00964) | 0.00883 (0.00984) | 0.00937 (0.00987) | 0.00900 (0.00991) |
| Age squared | 8.43e-05 (0.000107) | 9.36e-05 (0.000110) | 8.73e-05 (0.000111) | -7.56e-05 (0.000112) | -8.75e-05 (0.000112) | -8.03e-05 (0.000113) |
| Remittances | -0.0314 (0.0588) | 0.00272 (0.0590) | -0.000951 (0.0587) | 0.0329 (0.0628) | 0.00194 (0.0634) | 0.00328** (0.000194) |
| Place of residence | -0.102 (0.0670) | -0.102 (0.0671) | -0.111* (0.0660) | -0.0215 (0.0819) | -0.0300 (0.0822) | -0.0209 (0.0822) |
| National language (French) | -0.0477 (0.0646) | -0.0662 (0.0632) | -0.0570 (0.0638) | -0.00856 (0.0695) | 0.0223 (0.0680) | 0.0142 (0.0685) |
| National language (English) | -0.209*** (0.0695) | -0.189*** (0.0701) | -0.186*** (0.0698) | 0.0465 (0.0708) | 0.0447 (0.0709) | 0.0363 (0.0712) |
| Fluent in Beti | 0.235* (0.134) | 0.263** (0.132) | 0.226* (0.135) | 0.219 (0.134) | 0.237* (0.132) | 0.209 (0.135) |
| Fluent in Ffulbé | 0.131** (0.0623) | 0.134** (0.0623) | 0.142** (0.0615) | -0.0157 (0.0749) | -0.00472 (0.0747) | -0.0128 (0.0748) |
| Fluent in Pidgin | 0.170** (0.0662) | 0.162** (0.0675) | 0.157** (0.0682) | 0.0965 (0.106) | 0.0949 (0.107) | 0.104 (0.107) |
| Immigrant investment | -0.152** (0.0721) | -0.155** (0.0720) | -0.145** (0.0722) | -0.0373 (0.0718) | -0.0251 (0.0716) | -0.0377 (0.0717) |
| Immigrant insecurity | -0.000308 (0.0760) | -0.00527 (0.0764) | -0.0204 (0.0782) | -0.0183 (0.0842) | -0.0108 (0.0840) | 0.00284 (0.0852) |
| Refugeeinsecurity | -0.0238 (0.0745) | -0.0231 (0.0750) | -0.0104 (0.0745) | 0.114 (0.0825) | 0.120 (0.0819) | 0.111 (0.0823) |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.107 | 0.118 | 0.124 | 0.06 | 0.055 | 0.065 |
| Observations | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 |

Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.

Table 3. Robustness. Return migrants from African countries *versus* return migrants from non-African countries (probit model)

| | Social relations | | | | | | Quality of life | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Africa countries | | | Other countries | | | Africa countries | | | Other countries | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Degrees and qualifications | -0.158** (0.0719) | | | -0.0624 (0.220) | | | 0.273*** (0.0757) | | | 0.162 (0.305) | | |
| Other qualifications | | -0.130** (0.0628) | | | -0.183 (0.201) | | | 0.159** (0.0673) | | | 0.0902 (0.241) | |
| Qualifications | | | -0.171*** (0.0574) | | | -0.0492 (0.219) | | | 0.223*** (0.0628) | | | 0.00983 (0.265) |
| Duration abroad | 0.00189** (0.000824) | 0.00153** (0.000772) | 0.00172** (0.000791) | -0.000546 (0.00141) | -0.000422 (0.00142) | -0.000571 (0.00140) | 0.00139** (0.000652) | 0.00174*** (0.000667) | 0.00155** (0.000669) | -0.00145 (0.00214) | -0.00142 (0.00217) | -0.00126 (0.00208) |
| Duration sinceabroad | 0.000139 (0.000459) | 4.35e-05 (0.000470) | 6.43e-05 (0.000454) | -0.000406 (0.00161) | -0.000614 (0.00161) | -0.000387 (0.00160) | 0.000503 (0.000486) | 0.000643 (0.000467) | 0.000621 (0.000482) | 0.00117 (0.00240) | 0.000769 (0.00222) | 0.000637 (0.00228) |
| Age | -0.0126 (0.0113) | -0.0128 (0.0113) | -0.0129 (0.0115) | 0.0575 (0.0585) | 0.0570 (0.0577) | 0.0546 (0.0573) | 0.00677 (0.0115) | 0.0108 (0.0115) | 0.00745 (0.0116) | -0.0518 (0.0756) | -0.0406 (0.0688) | -0.0349 (0.0681) |
| Age squared | 0.000181 (0.000139) | 0.000184 (0.000140) | 0.000186 (0.000142) | -0.000728 (0.000656) | -0.000691 (0.000646) | -0.000688 (0.000640) | -8.53e-05 (0.000136) | -0.000144 (0.000137) | -9.85e-05 (0.000138) | 0.000781 (0.000854) | 0.000639 (0.000766) | 0.000584 (0.000759) |
| Remittances | 0.0499 (0.0601) | 0.0195 (0.0612) | 0.0204 (0.0602) | 0.110 (0.214) | 0.139 (0.215) | 0.113 (0.222) | -0.166** (0.0704) | -0.113 (0.0699) | -0.126* (0.0699) | -0.398* (0.213) | -0.391* (0.213) | -0.380* (0.222) |
| Place of residence | 0.0766 (0.0811) | 0.0872 (0.0822) | 0.0989 (0.0824) | -0.261 (0.276) | -0.196 (0.278) | -0.230 (0.268) | 0.0786 (0.0889) | 0.0684 (0.0886) | 0.0638 (0.0896) | 0.411** (0.196) | 0.381* (0.208) | 0.371* (0.216) |
| National language (French) | -0.0365 (0.0637) | 0.0554 (0.0656) | -0.0448 (0.0628) | -0.0640 (0.317) | -0.109 (0.318) | -0.0790 (0.315) | -0.0723 (0.0745) | 0.0225 (0.0715) | -0.0413 (0.0730) | 0.369 (0.252) | 0.385 (0.246) | 0.374 (0.258) |
| National language (English) | -0.224*** (0.0794) | 0.203*** (0.0690) | -0.202** (0.0795) | -0.0302 (0.209) | -0.0134 (0.206) | -0.0211 (0.205) | 0.115 (0.0826) | -0.114 (0.0795) | 0.101 (0.0828) | -0.0416 (0.237) | -0.0878 (0.218) | -0.0885 (0.220) |
| Fluent in Beti | -0.209 (0.147) | 0.213* (0.113) | -0.211 (0.146) | -0.276 (0.288) | -0.282 (0.286) | -0.259 (0.298) | 0.130 (0.158) | -0.154 (0.145) | 0.125 (0.158) | 0.0361 (0.0746) | 0.0325 (0.0754) | 0.0419 (0.0748) |
| Fluent in Pidgin | 0.154** (0.0602) | -0.199** (0.0987) | 0.138** (0.0640) | -0.145 (0.356) | -0.0578 (0.394) | -0.106 (0.384) | 0.0793 (0.115) | -0.0912 (0.110) | 0.102 (0.117) | 0.0204 (0.0651) | 0.0114 (0.0676) | 0.0230 (0.0651) |
| Fluent in Ffulbé | 0.0690 (0.0654) | -0.0812 (0.0732) | 0.0789 (0.0648) | -0.0221 (0.0691) | -0.0125 (0.0697) | -0.0146 (0.0699) | 0.00329 (0.0800) | -0.0337 (0.0789) | 0.00734 (0.0797) | -0.280 (0.369) | -0.239 (0.427) | -0.234 (0.463) |
| Immigrant investment | -0.160** (0.0766) | -0.181** (0.0778) | -0.159** (0.0765) | -0.0778 (0.277) | -0.00603 (0.308) | -0.0635 (0.295) | -0.0312 (0.0779) | -0.0233 (0.0775) | -0.0223 (0.0777) | 0.668*** (0.203) | 0.658*** (0.204) | 0.649*** (0.200) |
| Immigrant insecurity | 0.0622 (0.0713) | 0.0626 (0.0715) | 0.0406 (0.0749) | -0.331* (0.188) | -0.360* (0.185) | -0.330* (0.190) | 0.0500 (0.0981) | 0.0621 (0.0959) | 0.0873 (0.0990) | -0.500*** (0.145) | -0.499*** (0.150) | -0.498*** (0.152) |
| Refugeeinsecurity | -0.0351 (0.0795) | -0.0457 (0.0825) | -0.0261 (0.0796) | -0.0513 (0.236) | -0.0746 (0.236) | -0.0510 (0.239) | 0.188** (0.0942) | 0.167* (0.0936) | 0.189** (0.0933) | -0.0711 (0.289) | -0.0478 (0.297) | -0.0463 (0.305) |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.113 | 0.134 | 0.145 | 0.125 | 0.135 | 0.124 | 0.11 | 0.093 | 0.106 | 0.344 | 0.341 | 0.339 |
| Observations | 265 | 265 | 265 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 265 | 265 | 265 | 40 | 40 | 40 |

Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.

Table 4. Robustness. Return migrants from democratic countries *versus* return migrants from non-democratic countries (probit model)

| | Social relations | | | | | | Quality of life | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Democratic countries | | | Non-democratic countries | | | Democratic countries | | | Non-democratic countries | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Degrees and qualifications | -0.175 (0.204) | | | -0.106 (0.0719) | | | -0.0418 (0.203) | | | 0.266*** (0.0785) | | |
| Other qualifications | | -0.0932 (0.182) | | | -0.126** (0.0639) | | | 0.335* (0.174) | | | 0.114* (0.0689) | |
| Qualifications | | | 0.0154 (0.205) | | | -0.172*** (0.0582) | | | 0.269 (0.188) | | | 0.202*** (0.0648) |
| Duration abroad | 0.00100 (0.00142) | 0.000962 (0.00145) | 0.000857 (0.00144) | 0.00176** (0.000828) | 0.00148* (0.000773) | 0.00177** (0.000794) | -0.000801 (0.00143) | -0.00134 (0.00150) | -0.00118 (0.00148) | 0.00141** (0.000685) | 0.00178** (0.000710) | 0.00160** (0.000708) |
| Duration sinceabroad | 0.00104 (0.0483) | 0.000892 (0.0475) | 0.000880 (0.0471) | -0.000229 (0.000465) | -0.000328 (0.000470) | -0.000279 (0.000455) | -0.000182 (0.000951) | -0.000326 (0.000937) | -0.000441 (0.000945) | 0.000549** (0.00027) | 0.000675 (0.0449) | 0.000663* (0.000394) |
| Age | 0.00743 (0.0483) | 0.00304 (0.0475) | 0.00225 (0.0471) | -0.0151 (0.0118) | -0.0149 (0.0119) | -0.0151 (0.0120) | -0.00662 (0.0450) | -0.00662 (0.0449) | -0.0145 (0.0448) | 0.00561 (0.0110) | 0.00669 (0.0110) | 0.00577 (0.0111) |
| Age squared | -5.96e-05 (0.000537) | -6.19e-06 (0.000530) | -1.05e-05 (0.000523) | 0.000230 (0.000149) | 0.000227 (0.000149) | 0.000230 (0.000151) | 0.000106 (0.000491) | 7.67e-05 (0.000491) | 0.000179 (0.000488) | -5.21e-05 (0.000129) | -7.16e-05 (0.000129) | -5.77e-05 (0.000130) |
| Remittances | 0.138 (0.184) | 0.122 (0.182) | 0.0987 (0.186) | -0.0395 (0.0618) | -0.00571 (0.0612) | -0.00996 (0.0604) | -0.118 (0.177) | -0.230 (0.187) | -0.213 (0.183) | 0.134* (0.0723) | 0.0879 (0.0717) | 0.0918*** (0.0306) |
| Place of residence | -0.293 (0.223) | -0.194 (0.221) | -0.204 (0.217) | -0.0820 (0.0663) | -0.0938 (0.0649) | -0.101 (0.0628) | -0.0463 (0.248) | -0.0320 (0.229) | 0.0245 (0.228) | -0.0976 (0.0940) | -0.0808 (0.0930) | -0.0805 (0.0940) |
| National language (French) | 0.390* (0.219) | 0.358 (0.226) | 0.339 (0.235) | -0.0969 (0.0600) | -0.109* (0.0590) | -0.102* (0.0590) | 0.413** (0.204) | 0.415* (0.224) | 0.386* (0.228) | -0.0721 (0.0749) | -0.0361 (0.0729) | -0.0421 (0.0737) |
| National language (English) | -0.0289 (0.223) | 0.00883 (0.218) | -0.00245 (0.217) | -0.243*** (0.0790) | -0.227*** (0.0797) | -0.212*** (0.0790) | 0.155 (0.199) | 0.150 (0.203) | 0.187 (0.199) | 0.0639 (0.0809) | 0.0760 (0.0802) | 0.0540 (0.0807) |
| Fluent in Beti | -0.276 (0.261) | -0.269 (0.266) | -0.241 (0.269) | -0.215 (0.146) | -0.255* (0.147) | -0.215 (0.147) | 0.258 (0.267) | 0.356 (0.237) | 0.315 (0.249) | 0.125 (0.160) | 0.155 (0.157) | 0.124 (0.159) |
| Fluent in Ffuldéd | 0.477*** (0.160) | 0.460*** (0.170) | 0.460*** (0.170) | 0.0514 (0.0680) | 0.0577 (0.0680) | 0.0687 (0.0662) | -0.0505 (0.250) | -0.0183 (0.250) | -0.0587 (0.246) | -0.00843 (0.0813) | 0.00554 (0.0808) | -0.00624 (0.0810) |
| Fluent in Pidgin | -0.102 (0.333) | -0.0722 (0.337) | -0.118 (0.337) | 0.189*** (0.0490) | 0.184*** (0.0509) | 0.172*** (0.0529) | 0.476*** (0.177) | 0.487** (0.197) | 0.467** (0.204) | 0.0951 (0.119) | 0.0789 (0.117) | 0.108 (0.120) |
| Immigrants investment | 0.267*** (0.0445) | 0.233** (0.112) | -0.238 (0.234) | -0.205*** (0.0792) | -0.212*** (0.0786) | -0.195** (0.0786) | 0.108 (0.250) | 0.131 (0.248) | 0.154 (0.240) | -0.0280 (0.0790) | 0.00491 (0.0785) | -0.0145 (0.0786) |
| Immigrants insecurity | -0.318 (0.195) | -0.359** (0.181) | -0.365** (0.178) | 0.112* (0.0637) | 0.112* (0.0637) | 0.0966 (0.0669) | -0.0602 (0.210) | -0.136 (0.210) | -0.134 (0.206) | 0.00120 (0.102) | -0.0115 (0.0995) | 0.0158 (0.103) |
| Refugeeinsecurity | 0.244 (0.226) | 0.229 (0.231) | 0.209 (0.255) | -0.0712 (0.0816) | -0.0695 (0.0819) | -0.0668 (0.0819) | -0.193 (0.224) | -0.265 (0.222) | -0.328 (0.217) | 0.220** (0.0938) | 0.224** (0.0912) | 0.231** (0.0923) |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.0109 | 0.084 | 0.104 |
| Observations | 50 | 50 | 50 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 261 | 261 | 261 |

Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.

Table 5. Robustness. Effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life (IV probit)

| | Degrees and qualifications | Orther qualifications | Qualifications | Social relations | | | Quality of life | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Languagemastery | 0.178*** (0.0625) | 0.178*** (0.0672) | 0.230*** (0.0671) | | | | | | |
| Fitteddegrees and qualifications | | | | -0.658** (0.329) | | | 0.641* (0.357) | | |
| Fittedother qualifications | | | | | -0.561 (0.363) | | | 0.820** (0.392) | |
| Fitted qualifications | | | | | | -0.445 (0.281) | | | 0.742** (0.307) |
| Duration abroad | 0.00120** (0.000467) | 0.00104* (0.000591) | 0.00140** (0.000674) | 0.00199** (0.000872) | 0.00162* (0.000829) | 0.00160** (0.000813) | 5.85e-05 (0.000816) | 5.73e-05 (0.000761) | -4.97e-05 (0.000743) |
| Duration since return | 0.000601* (0.000348) | 3.36e-06 (0.000407) | 0.000261 (0.000435) | 0.000394 (0.000449) | -4.64e-06 (0.000398) | 0.000103 (0.000406) | 6.66e-05 (0.000468) | 0.000439** (0.000222) | 0.000264* (0.000157) |
| Age | 0.00448 (0.00937) | 0.000368 (0.00929) | 0.00200 (0.00996) | -0.00389 (0.00944) | -0.00532 (0.00943) | -0.00463 (0.00947) | 0.00637 (0.00991) | 0.00732 (0.00988) | 0.00568 (0.00996) |
| Age squared | -7.56e-05 (0.000111) | 1.42e-05 (0.000104) | -2.51e-05 (0.000113) | 4.61e-05 (0.000108) | 8.36e-05 (0.000107) | 6.52e-05 (0.000108) | -4.00e-05 (0.000114) | -7.65e-05 (0.000112) | -4.22e-05 (0.000113) |
| Remittances | -0.0398 (0.0547) | 0.165*** (0.0622) | 0.128** (0.0652) | -0.0433 (0.0595) | 0.0676 (0.0819) | 0.0334 (0.0683) | 0.0404*** (0.00808) | 0.115** (0.0586) | -0.076*** (0.0127) |
| Place of residence | -0.0846 (0.0769) | -0.0230 (0.0815) | -0.0844 (0.0846) | -0.125* (0.0657) | -0.0955 (0.0678) | -0.115* (0.0665) | 0.00344 (0.0826) | -0.0313 (0.0818) | 0.00804 (0.0819) |
| National language (French) | 0.105* (0.0583) | -0.0894 (0.0720) | -0.0322 (0.0739) | 0.0374 (0.0856) | -0.0769 (0.0630) | -0.0461 (0.0651) | -0.0775 (0.0869) | 0.0426 (0.0682) | -0.00791 (0.0691) |
| National language (English) | -0.107*** (0.0214) | -0.168** (0.0706) | -0.177** (0.0725) | -0.143* (0.0778) | -0.118 (0.0939) | -0.135 (0.0863) | 0.00114 (0.0778) | -0.0680 (0.0920) | -0.0588 (0.0845) |
| Fluent in Beti | 0.0263 (0.116) | -0.155 (0.106) | 0.0861 (0.138) | -0.203 (0.134) | -0.321** (0.141) | -0.192 (0.135) | 0.193 (0.136) | 0.322** (0.130) | 0.154 (0.139) |
| Fluent in Ffuld  | 0.0936 (0.0720) | 0.0593 (0.0748) | 0.101 (0.0776) | 0.165*** (0.0626) | 0.144** (0.0627) | 0.152** (0.0632) | -0.0461 (0.0775) | -0.0364 (0.0757) | -0.0571 (0.0766) |
| Fluent in Pidgin | -0.0879 (0.0809) | -0.100 (0.0895) | -0.123 (0.100) | 0.132* (0.0776) | 0.126 (0.0830) | 0.131 (0.0805) | 0.131 (0.109) | 0.175 (0.114) | 0.178 (0.112) |
| Immigrant investment | 0.0855*** (0.0285) | 0.0423 (0.0730) | 0.0990** (0.0495) | -0.0868 (0.0794) | -0.127* (0.0749) | -0.106 (0.0791) | -0.0865 (0.0788) | -0.0680 (0.0740) | -0.105 (0.0769) |
| Immigrant insecurity | -0.00814 (0.0710) | -0.0497 (0.0799) | -0.142* (0.0830) | -0.00571 (0.0763) | -0.0274 (0.0798) | -0.0602 (0.0890) | -0.0119 (0.0836) | 0.0211 (0.0867) | 0.0803 (0.0956) |
| Refugeeinsecurity | 0.122 (0.0790) | 0.0717 (0.0810) | 0.150* (0.0837) | 0.0305 (0.0771) | -0.000724 (0.0760) | 0.0201 (0.0786) | 0.0657 (0.0878) | 0.0810 (0.0841) | 0.0376 (0.0882) |
| Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) | 0.704 | 0.456 | 0.334 | | | | | | |
| Observations | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 | 311 |

Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.

6. Conclusion

This article examined for the first time, the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon. For this purpose, we used original data from a survey carried out in 2012 by IFORD. We use the formal and informal skills acquired abroad by the return migrant. These are materialised by three indicators, namely: new competences as a whole, degrees and qualifications and other qualifications. The main results, based on a probit model, show that formal and informal competences acquired abroad reduce the probability that return migrants improve social relations and increase the likelihood that they will increase quality of life in their home country. These results remain robust to the inclusion of return migrants from African and non-democratic countries. Correcting for the endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by the two-stage probit model with exogenous regressors does not alter our conclusions. Overall, our results confirm the hypothesis that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination to origin countries.

The main limitation of this work is the small sample size and the fact that not all dimensions of social cohesion are taken into account. Thus, new studies can be envisaged by evaluating the impact of new skills on social cohesion by considering all its dimensions. Other avenues of research could also include the impact of new skills acquired abroad on the local labor market or a comparison of labor market performance between migrants and non-migrants. During their stay abroad, migrants absorb new attitudes and values that they try to transfer to their home communities either upon return or through telephone contacts. Therefore, new studies can verify whether return migrants transfer environmental or technological values from the host to their home countries.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

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