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Persistent Private Information. (2008). Williams, Noah.
In: 2008 Meeting Papers.
RePEc:red:sed008:360.

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Cited: 4

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Cites: 34

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Cocites: 22

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Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory. (2018). Villeneuve, Stephane ; Decamps, Jean-Paul.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:32397.

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  2. A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory. (2018). Villeneuve, Stephane ; Decamps, Jean-Paul.
    In: IDEI Working Papers.
    RePEc:ide:wpaper:32396.

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  3. Dynamic Contracting with Persistent Shocks. (2009). Zhang, Yuzhe.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23108.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks. (2009). Zhang, Yuzhe.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:635-675.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. New Results in Recursive Contract Theory. (2011). Marimon, Ramon.
    In: 2011 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed011:752.

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  2. Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs. (2010). Violante, Giovanni L ; Setty, Ofer ; Pavoni, Nicola.
    In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275749.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy. (2010). Weber, Guglielmo ; Attanasio, Orazio.
    In: Journal of Economic Literature.
    RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:48:y:2010:i:3:p:693-751.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Enterprise Dynamics and Finance: Distinguishing Mechanism Design from Exogenously Incomplete Markets Models. (2008). Townsend, Robert ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
    In: 2008 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed008:846.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Persistent Private Information. (2008). Williams, Noah.
    In: 2008 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed008:360.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment. (2007). Martin, Fernando ; Karaivanov, Alexander.
    In: 2007 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed007:793.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Trade. (2007). Zhang, Yuzhe ; Mitchell, Matthew.
    In: 2007 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed007:1023.

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  8. Risk Sharing in Private Information Models with Asset Accumulation: Explaining the Excess Smoothness of Consumption. (2007). Pavoni, Nicola ; Attanasio, Orazio.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12994.

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  9. Optimal Income Taxation with Human Capital Accumulation and Limited Record Keeping. (2006). Kapicka, Marek.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:05-24.

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  10. Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs. (2006). Violante, Giovanni ; Pavoni, Nicola.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5937.

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  11. Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets. (2006). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000445.

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  12. Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets. (2005). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11185.

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  13. Commentary on Public education in the dynamic city: lessons from New York City. (2005). Conley, Dalton.
    In: Economic Policy Review.
    RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2005:i:dec:p:173-176:n:v.11no.2.

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  14. Optimal welfare-to-work programs. (2005). Violante, Giovanni ; Pavoni, Nicola.
    In: Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:fip:fedmem:143.

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  15. Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing. (2005). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000450.

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  16. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES. (2005). Maestri, Lucas ; da Costa, Carlos Eugênio.
    In: Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2005:089.

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  17. Figuring out the Impact of Hidden Savings on Optimal Unemployment Insurance. (2004). Kocherlakota, Narayana.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:3:p:541-554.

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  18. Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing. (2004). Tsyvinski, Aleh ; Golosov, Mikhail.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10792.

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  19. On the Recursive Saddle Point Method. (2004). Pavoni, Nicola ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:255.

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  20. On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time. (2004). Williams, Noah.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000426.

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  21. On the Recursive Saddle Point Method. (2004). Pavoni, Nicola ; Messner, Matthias.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000050.

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  22. Dynamic Mechanism Design With Hidden Income and Hidden Actions. (2002). Townsend, Robert ; Doepke, Matthias.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:818.

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Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

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