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Quotient Spaces of Boundedly Rational Types. (2011). Germano, Fabrizio ; Cianciaruso, Davide.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:bge:wpaper:582.

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  1. Invariance to representation of information. (2015). Yildiz, Muhamet.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:94:y:2015:i:c:p:142-156.

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References

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  27. Intrinsic correlation in games. (2008). Friedenberg, Amanda ; Brandenburger, Adam .
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