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Political Economy

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This RePEc Biblio topic is edited by Vasileios Bougioukos. It was first published on 2012-12-06 17:41:34 and last updated on 2020-08-15 03:58:48.

Introduction by the editor

The relations between ecomomic and political sphere are investigated under the term "Political Economy" for nearly three centuries. Through the ages different frameworks have been developed in order to eplxain the aforementioned relations. The sprectrum of this theorerical enterpprise starts from the "classical" approach and ends up to modern heterodox approaches.

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Most relevant research

  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 460-501, June.
  2. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
  3. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 57-78, March.
  4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  5. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328-328.
  6. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
  8. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
  9. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987. "Trade and the variety of democratic institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 203-223, April.
  10. Markwell, Donald, 2006. "John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292364.
  11. Alesina, Alberto F & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 565, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 57-78, March.
  13. Baker, Dean, 1994. "Theories of Political Economy, James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, viii + 243 pages," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 354-359, October.
  14. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.